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THE CRISIS OF IRISH EylPLOY:'YlE:\T
Ireland has entered the 1990s with almost J qumer of a million peopk or'fici~jjy I.lnemployee.
and with more people emigrating than at any time since th~ disastrous : 9505. [n ..iGdition. :~e
1980s have witnessed a Zfowine: tendency r'or those who are at w ":0 be :U1-ume. :ei.1oor:.!Iv.
C:lsual. or seasonal, while
re- are many t ous:lnds of people who are :~ot registered ..is oe1I1g
j)'arr"of th~rce but who would take up suit:lble paid employment if i~ \\ ere ..iv:.lliJbk. The
1980s have also seen a markedly growing incidence of low r~ues of pay among those :H \\ ork,
At the same time the 1980s were undoubtedlv verv ~ood for some sectOrs or' Irish socierv.
Farmers finished ;he decade on :.l \V~l.\'e of pro·speritY. - Throughout the decade. the pror'its of
private business boomed on the back of bvish government incenti\'es :lnd rapid :ncre:.lses in
worker productivity which grew much faster :han worker remuneration. fno'Jsm:.ll OU[;)U
e;spanded bv fiftv oer cent while indusrrial emolovment went down bv one fifth. The \rfo\\'th or'
business services, the ~anent embargQ in the public service. an me in.:re:lsing trend :o\vards
sub-contractine: have all induced a major Zfowth in all sons of consultancies and other kinds of
'self-employeC1- workers who have been among the main culprits in the massive ,:lX evasion
revealed by the 1988 tJ.X amnesty.
~evenheless, overall, average income levels in Ireland have shown no :encency tOwards c2.tching
up with those elsewhere in the European Community. Ireland's relative position in the
Community h2.s only remained Stable because of the addition of even poorer member states in the
1980s. Relative to the wealthier !TIembers, our position has continued to worsen.

Ireland's average standard of living is greatly depressed by the existence of some one million
people - one third of the entire population - living in dire poveILy in our midst, as documented in
research carried out by the Economic and Social Research Institute on behalf of the Combat
Poveny Agency. This poveny is mainly due to unemployment and low incomes among many of
those in employment. It is clear that the Irish economy has failed to provide employ:nent ",;hich
is adequate - in terms both of quantity and quality - for the needs of our society.
The crisis in L-ish employment is by no means a recent phenomenon. In i'aCt, reCL::Tem crises
have been a consistent feature of the Irish economy ever since inde;Jendence was 1chieved in
1922.
ere are now fewer people at work in Ireland than there were :lt the found:ltion of the,
~ This sure y In itse IS an tnQlctment at t e leadership provided by the dominant political
parnes in Ireland over the last seventy years. Cnemploymem levels have only been conw.ined by
high levels of emigration: over one ., oeo le h ve emi!IT3.ted from the independent Ireland
of which so much had been promised by the proponents of national sovereignty.
There have, of course, been brief periods when employment at home expanded significantly J,nd
emigration was greatly reduced or even reversed. In all cases, howeve:-. the prospect of longterm prosperity which these intervals held out has ultimately been sh:me:-ed by the :-esumption of
stagnation. crisis and despair. The recurring nightmare of homes :lnd families cesIToyed by
unemployment and emigration is a testimony to the failure of successive governments to come to
grips with the fundamental deficiencies of the Irish economy.
It is not sufficient to plead that Ireland is a small country, that it lacks resources, or :h:lt it is the
helpless victim of international circumstances. There are many other small Europe:l:1 economies
which were less developed than Ireland at the beginning of the century but which h:J.ve managed
consistent growth in the intervening period. and which now enjoy st:lnda.rds of living and !evels
of employment which are the envy of the world. The record or" Finl;;.nd. \'Of'.\jlY. Sweden and
-.Denmark provides decisive proof th:lt the notion of secure and well-p:lid employment for an in :l
small economy is by no means a hopeless pipedream as the twenty first century beckons.

THE FAILCRE OF IRISH PRIVATE E:--';TERPRISE
Since independence. Ireland h:J.s been ruled exciusivcly by gO\'e~:1mc:Hs \\ nl..:h :-t:l\'C ::-ccn
committed to priv:J.te enterprise as the lynchpin upon which economic gro\\ [h ~~ouid JC2C:ld.
The failure, therefore. of the Irish economy to deliver adequ;He e:nploymenr oppol1unitic:; for .ui
the Irish people must be seen. essentially, :lS the f:lilure of Irish c:.lpit:J.lism. Despite bcing :;!\'en
every opportunity to do so by supportive adminisrrations. Irish pri"':lte cnterpr.se :tJS :iii1"lpiy
failed to develop ,he kinds of industries \vhich could offer a \vay out of [he countr:..:' S perSlS'ent
predic:J.II1ent.

The Colonial Heritage
The f:lilures of Irish c:lpit:1lism 3Ie rooted in histOry. En:J.ctments by the British gover:-:r.lenr
going :J.S f:u- back as the seventeenth century plJ.ced fundament:1l restrictions on the developme'it
of Irish industry. Apm from the linen indusrry (to which exceptional circumst:J.nces :lpplied).
Irish industry therefore was in no position to compete with its British counterparts following the
integr:J.rion' of the twO economies ilfter the ACt of Union in 1800. As a result. in the nineteenth
century the Irish economy (apm from the nOl1h east) tOok on a one-dimensional configur2.tion.
concenrrating on the production of agriculrur3.l products for export to Britain.
In the absence of economic diversification, the emigrant ship offered the only possib"te
employment outlet for growing numbers of enrrams to the labour force. The selecive l1:lt'..:re of
emigration, however, meant that frequently it was the most enterprising and able of Irela:id' s
young people who moved abroad for personal advancement. At home, in the :lbsence of
alternative outlets, Irish capitalists (mainly big fanners, me~chants and shopkeepers) concentrated
their investments in property, bank deposits and government securities - outletS requiring little
risk or enremnse. As a result. Ireland c::.rried into the twentieth centurv :l conse:-vat:ve ar.c
closed-minde'd society bereft of key elements which provided the wellspring of bold chinking and
dynamism elsewhere.

The Limits of Economic :--';ationalism
Ireland's ftrst indeoendent government - dominated bv the forerunners of the Dresent Fine Gael
pany - made no 'attempt to reshape the ~conomic' srructures which it h:J.ct inherued. The
subsequent Fianna Fail government (fIrst eleCted in 1932) made what initially appeJ.red to be J
bold attempt to create an independent Irish industrial base. ge3Ied to serving the needs of J. selfsufficient economy. However, while this srrategy. based on a philosophy of Economic
:\'ationalism, created a substantial number of new jobs in the e3Ily stages. fundamental probie:ns
quickly became app3Ient. Because of the sm3.11 - and shrinking - size of the Irish market. the :leW
industries could not achieve the economies of scale which could m:J..ke them internJ.tionallv
competitive. They were mainly contined to basic consumer products utilising st:lnda:dised
technology and imponed equipment :J.nd raw materials.
They therefore .n"'ol ... ~d lit:!e
technological innovation or backward link::ges within Ireland. In essence. little srimubtion or"
enrrepreneurial abilities was required to se( up factories to s~rve a loe:!l m:u-ket which '.','J,:;
heavily protected by government-imposed tJ.riffs.
The limits of Fianna Fail protec~ionism became sharply app3Ient in the 1950s. \Vhii~ the :-esr or"
Western Europe was booming, in Ireland industrial growth ground to J hJlt Jnd emi~rat!on
reached record levels. It is likelv that. had the Irish ~ovemment abandoned its insular :.It:;·UG;:
and participated fully in Europe's' POStW3I ;-ecovery. the Irish economy would have cmerged i:1 .l
much srrengthened position. .-\s it was. the highly conservative Irish poiitic:ll and econor:~:..:
establishment was only preptlred to countenance major ch:J.nge when it \l,;lS v il1uJily forced u;:l0n
it by the deepening crisis or [he late 19505. and when the Oppol1ul1lties presenteti Jy :he iJOSt·.\~;
boom had l3Igely passed.

It was clear that funher economic growth required the development of export markets. of which
lrish industry. as it was then srructured, was simply incapabk. The record or' othe:- countries
which have succeeded in bremng into export markets pointS :0 ~he i.:r1Jci:l1 rolc of rJlb.::.1l
government intervention to create new srructures appropriate to t:-'e t:.l~h:. This Cl!1 be: :iecn from
the case of Germanv in the late nineteenth centurY. where j r:i:.lSSi\'c Jro~r:.lmme: of ."::.e
investment in infrasrructure. technology :md rraining, j,ilied to ci:-ecr gO\ cr:lmc;t :n\'oi\'cme:nt :Ii
the creation of banking and business sectOrs geared to industri::l ~r()\\ th. p!:.lycd thc ~C:i ,ok !n
creating the most dynamic industrial economy in Europe.
Similarly, Japan's rapid emergence from feudal obscurity in :he l:.lte nineteenth century \\:.1S
based on an energetic policy of governrnent intervention. including \V'idespre:ld creation of st:1teowned enterprises in key secmrs, md major intervention in :he priv:lte sectOr :0 promOte
srructures capable of penerr:Hing foreign m:lI'kers. South Kore:l 2nd T:1i'.\:1n :nve more rece:;ti:;
borrowed heavilv from the Jaoanese model. and are now :-.::ev ,an:ctS in the Indus,,::.l:
Development Aurhority's continued drive to JrITact high-tech fore:gn investment to IreLlnd.
The Blinkers of the Irish Economics Profession
L'nfonunately, the thinking of the Irish economics profession. which has always wielded
considerable influence on government economic policy, has been I:lrgely shaped by the
conventional thinking of the English-spea...lGng countries from which it has obtained most of its
literature and much of its training. This has meant a particular re iance on Brit<lin and the L:SA,
the two great pioneers of industrial capitalism.
These 1:\:"'0 countries had based their
industrialisation on the £':fadual emergence of a broadly-based enrrepreneurial culture over a
lengthy gestation period.-and in the absence of major established competitors elsewhe:-e. They
therefore succeeded in creating: advanced industrial economies without the need for larg:e-scale
direct state involvement, and this has been refleCted in an economics literature domin-ated by
concepts of free enterprise, compejtion. and minimal state inrer:'e:-e:1ce,
While this approach may have been quite appropriate to the specific circumstances of these
particular countries, it cenainly is not '0 later-developing economies. including Irei:lnd.
However, while many Other countries managed to develop alternative models of their own.
Ireland remained trapped in what was a highly inappropriate imponed model.
It is doubtful in any case whether Ireland would have been caoable of embracin£ the kind of
long-term planning,' requiring shon-tenn sacrifices for greater long-term gain. pursued by those
late-developing economies which have succeeded in creating an industrial export base. This was
because of Ireland's domination by a culture of small-scale capitalists obsessed \I,'ith immedi2te
gain, and a political system characterised by petty parochialism ::.nd preoccupied \v'ith the limited
objective of winning the next election. Given its inability to tackle the fundame:1tal dericiencies
of the domestic economy, it is hardly surprising, therefore. th::.t the Irish go\'ernmenr turned
instead to foreign capital to provide a solution to the crisis situat:on in which it found itself in :l;e
late 1950s.
THE FAILURE OF THE FOREIGN INVEST\-lE:\iT \'IOOEL
The pursuit of foreign investment appeared to offer a ready solut:on to the problems v. hich
economic nationalism had failed to overcome. Foreign - especi::dy Americ::ln - investment '.vas
growing rapidly in the 1950s. \lulrinarional firms were seen to have plenty of investment CJpit:.ll.
modern technology, and ready access to expon markets - in all or' which Irebnd WJS ddicier.t.
With the European Community in the process of being formed. ::r.d '.vith bOth Ent:lin ;l:ld Ireland
anticipating early membership. Irebnd could offer m:ln: :mract:ons as :l b:1se for suppiying :'1e
European marker. A combination of t:lX reliefs Jnd CJpit:U grants were to be the m:1ln Jtrr:lctions
for foreign capitaL along with ~elatively cheap. plentiful :lnd English-~pe~ing !:lbour. The
Industrial Development .Authority W:lS geared p to promOte Ire:and :lS an invcstment locatlon
:1broad.
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The new policy's impact was initially rest:r.tined by the delay in sccu;"::lg ~:lrry to the: El.lrope::tn
Community, although the free tr:lde agreement with the United Kir..:;dom in 1965 did have a
substantial positive dfect. \Vhen EC membership w::ts finu.ily se..:~reLi in 1973. it had ~he
predicted consequence of a major acceler:uion in foreign inves::-:1e~: ::Hlow~. pmicularly in
modern growth sectOrs such as elecrronics 3.nd pharmaceutlc:lls. \\":t~ :he LS.-\ pLt ying the
leading role. by 1980 over 800 foreign firms were employin g ~Oc:.· c·:' :he industrial \, orkr"orce.
producing over half of total industrial output. 3.nd 3.ccounting ror 'Oc-c 0i' ilon-rood manut'acturec
expons.
On the downside, Ireland' s increasing participation in intern:ltior.:ll ::nde me:J.nt th:lt the
inefficient finns set up during the prOtectionist period were now exposed :0 r'oreign competition.
Despite government 3.ttempts to modernise 3.nd ratOnalise these fir::1s. :here was 3. major sh:J.keout of indigenous fIrms in the 1970s which \ITeatlv counterbal3.nced e:nDlovmer:r ~owth in the
foreign-owned sector.
\'everthe!ess, there was substantial 0\·~r:::.ll' ~o\'-th ~n indust:i:::.!
employment during the decade and this. plus the high level of :i;-.:::ic:::I t10ws from the EC
(mainly in agricultural subsidies) and the gradual build-up in fore:gn borrowing, created 3.
booming economv which nor onlv brou2:hr emi\ITarion to a halt. t-..;t in t3.ct 3.rtracted man\'
previous emigrants back home, especially from the-ailing British ecor.o;ny.
'
The 1980s: The Foreign Investment Chickens Go Home to Roost

However, as with the protectionist policies of the 1930s, the initial suc:ess enjoyed by the foreign
investment policy eventually began to fade, ~s fundamental we::"'~1esses in the policy became
increasingly apparent in the 1980s, The post-1973 surge inevirab:y began ro ebb. wilh the
assistance of the major internarional recession of the early eighties. W:,h foreign flrms importing
most of lheir material inpurs and services. there was limited .0c::.2 spin-off within "he Irish
economv. This meant that the single \ITeatesr benefIt of the foreis:! :::vesrme:lt Dolicv lav in the
direct creation of jobs in the foreign- plants themselves. Howeve:-. !he slowctown" :n 'foreign
capital inflows allied to the growing use of labour-saving techno ogy has severely curtailed this
particular beneflt also. Thus, wilh the conrraction i.n employmer.t in cornestic fmns continuing,
the 1980s have seen a major reduction in industrial employment, des~:te continued rapid growth
in overall industrial production (Table 1). By 1988, industrial OUrpUL ::1 re::.! terms, was ove:- two
thirds greater than the 1980 level, whereas employment had been t'educed by over one fifth.
TABLE 1
Y1anufacturing \1anufacturin!!
Output Index Employment"
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

100.0
106.0
104.6
112.6
126.7
130,1
133.3
1.+7.2
168.6

227.200
222.500
215,100
202.200
195.600
186.900
18.+.1 00
181.500
180,'+00

Source: ESRI
Y1uch of this apparent growth in indusaial output is due [0 ct'e3.t. \ ~ Jook-ke~ping by 'oreig:l
firms anxious to concenrr:lte the profits from their international o;:-e:-:H:ons in Irei:.lnd. \\.'h~:·e
effective tax rates are at or near zero. This is done by paying an,r·ic:J.Jy lo\\: prices for imported
materials from affiliate companies abroad. and by charging mi:·::::.tlly high ;mc~s r'or the
products which they sell on to other overseas :l1Tiliates. Tnis 50-..:alied ":r:.tn:-rcr pri~e'

manipulation means that the Irish operations of these finns make ll1 the prer! s It the cxpe :lse of
foreign affiliates. Given the imponaI1ce of foreign !inns in Ireland' s foreign U"Jde. it Jlso rneJns
that Irish impon figures are significantly understated. while export figu:-es :u-e eXJggerateti. In
other words. the positive rrade balance of recent years which has bee~ ::;uch hypeu by Insh
governments is. in fact. nOthing more than l con crick. The tiirlerencc :-crween 10 P(WS .lnU
exportS represents the profitS being made by foreign :lnns. most or" '." n:..:~ .lre ~ub cL.jucm!:
moved abroad. thereby wiping out the apparent benefits of Irebnd' S 0(:':..::.:.1 tralie ~llrnlll:-'. [n
essence. Ireland loses
on the swings
what
it gains on the roundabouts.
.
Table :2 shows the starJing growth in the annual outflow from Irellnti or" pror'its. diviJends Jnti
rovalties. Thev now account for over one third of the total ournut of ::1e Irish manur':lC:urin!!
sector and: moie signiIIcantlv, one tenth of Gross Domestic Prod~ct (GDP) - :he ~et \'Jlue of :l11
goods and services-produced within the Irish economy (lfter allowing :'or :mpons l. By: ')('I:-S.
reparriated profits accounted for llmost twO thirds of all Irish complny ?'o'::s ..-\ recent r"orec:lst
by the Economic and Social Research Institute expects the protlts outr10w - alreJciy llarrningly
high - to double in volume over the next five years and to increase ste3.cily as l proportion of
GDP (Table 3). In fact, the forecast figure for 1989 has already been exceeded by almost £300
million, su££estin£ that even the ESRl's ominous estimates are £oing to be si£nific:lntlv
understated~\\tnat-is alanning about this situation is that the reinvestrr~er.: o~· orofits is-the kev to
economic growth in any eco~omy, so that the high and growing level of prot!t outflow f;om
Ireland places major consrraints on Ireland's future growth pOtential.
TABLE 2
Outflows of profits, dividends and royaities from Ire!a:-:d
Outflows

As % of
Indusrrial
Ourput

(£:'1)

.+99
659
983
1,321
1,320
1,307
1,908
2.337

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

As (;""c of
GDP
",

11.5
13.7
18.3
21.9

6.0

:.5

21.2

-;.1

.,--19.8..,

6.5
9.0
10.0

/.~

n.a.

Source: CSO, Cenrral Bank. ESRI
TABLE 3
Projected Profit Outflows. 1989-199..+

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
199.+

Cv!

As % of
GDP

2.062
2.413
2.7'+3
3.080
3.5"+9
-+.020

9.1
9.5
9.8
10.1
10.8
11..+

Source: ESRI \kdium Term Re . . iew. June 19:'SSl
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INDliSTRIAL POLICY F.-\ILI~GS EXPOSED: THE TELESIS REPORT
As long ago as 1982, the heavy reliance on foreign investment in Irebnd' s .ndusrrijl policy \\ as
trenchantly criticised in a government-sponsored repon: by the .-\menc:.ln TdeslS Con.:ultJ.rlcy
Group. Foreign fInns. it was r"ound. mainly loc:ue routine production .l:1d :cstlng :"unctlons in
Ireland - functions which are most vulner:J.ble to corpor:ue retrenchment poli-:ies. Key ~spects or"
the international operations of multinational tinns. such as research. produc( c!e\'c:!opment.
marketing and strategic decision-making are nOtably absent from [he Irish pi:.lrltS of foreign r"irms,
:\s a result, the potential for the transfer of high-level skills from the :"oreign-owned sector to
native Irish fIrms is very limited. In addition. because the skills concerned ;UIT:J.ct high levels of
remuneration compared with the more routine functions located in Ire!:J.nd. :.lnd bec:luse these
skills are svstematicallv retained in the home countries of mult:nation:J.i firms. this reint'orces
Ireland's second class status in terms or' international livin2: st2.ndards. Ire!J.nd must secure its
fair share of these hi2her functions if it is ever to break out of this infe:ior sr:ltus. This C:ln on:\'
be realistically achie;;ed by the expansion of Irish-based tirms rather th:tn ;-e!ying inordinately' on
foreign rlIms for industrial growth.
Telesis also found the Dolicv of atrractin2 forei2n investment to be undulv eX'Jensive - eSDeciallv
given the limited spin~offs 'which were being generated. Annu2.1 grant 'expenditures or'sever:ll
hundred million pounds, along with about one thousand million pouncs \, on:h of tax revenue
foregone annually due to ta.x reliefs, represent a very substantial.drain on the government coffers.
:'1uch of this re\'enue would be bener spent in the long run if devOted ins(ead to the development
of home-based Irish indusrrv, in Telesis's view. .

.

At the same time, Telesis also had some scathing comments to ma..l.(e about existing Irish
indigenous industry, which was seen as being too smail in scale, 12.cking in quality and reiiability,
and too dependent on ongoing state suppon:. The most successful Irish fiill1s initially developed
in sectors sheltered from outside competition. These rirms have since e:qanded via investment
abroad in their existin2: lines of activitv. rather than via di\·ersi!:.::l.t:on :H ~ome, The\' ,lierefore
have made very little conrribution to solving Ireland's unemployment problem.
.
Telesis was also severely critic:li of Irel:3.nd's failure to build properly on local natural resources.
Referring particularly to agriculture and forestry, Telesis pointed to poor quality cont-ol 3.t ~he
stage of primary production and poor integration between (his s~:lge and downstream processing
and marketing. The repon saw considerable potential for home-based indusrri:l! expansion in this
area, as well as in selected segments of modem high-tech indUStry.

THE" CLIMATOLOGY" APPROACH TO ECOl\O\lIC GRO\VTH
The approach of successive Irish governments to stimulating Irish private business exp:J.nsion h:lS
been dominated by what has become derisively known as the "climatology" sc~ool of economics.
This approach is founded on the erroneous view that if :J.n apFopri::te "clim::te" conducive to
private enterprise can be created. then the private sectOr will respond by providing the levels or
investment necessary to make serious inroads into the unemployment problem.
The invalidity of this argument was demonstrated powerfully in the 1980s, when a particularly
favourable climate for enterprise existed in Ireland. A variety of tax-based incentive schemes
were available; government gr:tnts and employment subsidies v..ere re::dily avail::ble: intlation
rates reached their lowest levels in decades and bank interest rates v..e;-e ;J.lso reduced
significantly; the trade unions showed a new preparedness to [olen.te \l,'age moderation.
particularly at a time when labour productivity was incre:J.sing rJpidly: savage government
cutbacks reduced the burden on the economy or" high levels of ;:Jublic spending: \\ ell-educJted
and trained young workers were becoming available in rapidly-g:-owing :lumbers: easier 3.ccess to
European markets beckoned after 1992 and was already becomirig a reali ty in the sh3.pe or much
cheaper air transpon:: a massive public investment programme had give:1 Ire!:lnd one or" the most
modern telecomrnunic:J.tions systems anywhere.
6

Successive Irish governments :l!ld spokespersons for Lrish business ha\."~ ;epe:1r~J!y ~b.:cd
particular emphasis on the containment of labour COStS .1S the key to ewnomi-: ;:xpan:-ion Jnd
employment growth in Ireland. The experience of the 1980s h.1s been IllOSt ln~(:-UC:l\e :n ~his
respect. As Table 4 shows. while the :'lVerage productivity !i.e. output per '.\ork~r I n( !,;~h
indusaial workers more than doubled between 1980 and 1988. the re:.l1 e:.tr.:i:l~~ ; ~r',er .li:,'", ::1:":
for inrlation) of these workers only increased by 11.59'0 in the s:une period. [n 0[h;::- '.\,)rl::'. i1~O:>-l
of the benefits of this increased productivity have gone re companies in the form or' proii[:, ',I. ;~:-:h.
as Table 6 shows. almost doubled in this period.
TABLE .+
Trends in Productivitv, E3.rnin~s and Cnit
in .\[an~facturing Indusrry
Real
Earnings

Productiviry

Costs

-

Unit Wage COStS
Relative re ylain
Trading Partners

100.0
97.3
93.7
94.6
97.2
99.9
104.5
107.7
111.5

100.0
108.3
110.9
127.9
145.3
158.9
166.0
187.7
212.5

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

\Va~e

100
90
94
88
83
79
85
77
68

Source: CSO, Cenrral Bank
The dramatic growth of Irish labour Droductivitv relative re real wa~es has also me:'J.nr that ~here
has been a co;lsiderable reduction in'Irish unit ;:"'age COSts compared to those of I:-e!~nd' s major
rrading panners in the 1980s, as Table 4 also shows. By 1988. Ireland's re!ati\"e \\'~ge cos,s \vere
more than one third below the 1980 figure. The low level of Irish labour -:ostS is i'unher
illusrrated in Table 5, which shows actual pay costs in indusrry for Ireland :l!ld eight othe:developed counrries. It is clear that Irish COStS are well below those of our main tr:lding panne:s.
TABLE 5
A verage Hourly Compensation in .\1anufacturing

(inc!. Fringe Benefits) in CSS (June 1989)
2.
3.

W. Germanv
Switzerland'
Sweden

4.

~etherlands

5.
6.

USA
Japan
France
United Kinadom
IRELA?\TI

1.

7.

8.
9.

~

Source: Business Europe Report

17.95
17.55
17.00
15.81
1.+.54
13.80
12,90
11.19
9.78

The response of the private sectOr to this unprecedented business climJt~ is ~ow '.~cil-~n()\\ n:
while private profits soared. so did unemployment (T:J.ble 6). Thus. '.vhile .;()rr:;:::.tny tJrofits
earned in Ireland almost doubled in real terms between 1980 and 1983. Jnemplo: i:~e:lt ~:e\... c\ en
more quickly (by almost 150%) while m:muf:J.cturing employment slurr:peJ ~y l)ne ::r:h. In )(r.e:words. contrary to the lI'guments of the right-wing politic:ti po.rties. inc:-e:..:sed p:or:~J.oti~[:. :us :~Ot
been translated into employment-creating investment by Irish business. The prom::,c:, ::eiJ tlU :0
those in employment that wage restraint relative to productivity would !eJ.d to n,;ore ~oo~ ,'or :::()~e
OUt of work have simply not been fulfilled. Even the modest proposals in the' 9. ..;. \Vhite P~:pe:
on Industrial Policy to create between 3.000 and 6.000 extra indusmal jobs per :lnnl.lm n:.t';e :'ee:1
rendered farcical by the subsequent continued drop in indusrrial employr:1ent.
TABLE 6
The Growth of Profits and Cnemployme:1t
Real Company
Tr:lding Profits
1980
1981
1982
1983
19841985
1986
1987
1988

100.0
115.9
110.3
119.5
137.3
152.5
161.6
175.8
191.7(est.)

C nemployment
101,500
117 .900
156,600
192,800
21'+,200
230,600
236.-+00
247,300
2·H.-+00

Source: CSO. ESRl
It is cle:ll" that the Irish gove:nment is obtaining a woeful rerum for the massive input of
manpower and resources which it is putting into indusrrial development. Tnrough ~he 1980s. up
to £400 millions was being spent annually in grantS to industry and funding ror Sr:He de\'eiopmenr
and rraining agencies. An extensive lI'f3.y of such agencies has been created. er:;ploying 3.500
public servantS, in order to assist with the development of Irish indusrry. The :lgencies involv~J.
and the funding for each for 1986 (the laSt yelI' for which detailed estimates :lre :J.v:J.il:lble), :lre
shown in Table 7. In addition. over £1.000 million each ve:lr is bein~ lost la the ozove:-nment in
revenue due to the operation of various tax incentive schemes (T3.ble 8\ Yet. in return for :J. tOt:J.I
cost to the state of over £ 10 billions, by the end of the 19805. there were ~O.OOO Less p~ople
working in Irish industry than th~re were at the beginning of the dec2.de. To borrow from ,h~
terminology of the New Right, this is cenainly nor value for money.
It is clear from the experience of the 1980s that the creation of 3.n extremely attr:J.c:\e ciim:lte for
private enterprise has gone nowhere ne:lr producing an adequate response in terms or job-cre:ning
investment. While job creation may be a major objective of government. profit :-e::.!isJtion :s the
prime consideration for private business. and the array of aids :md incentiv~s pro\'iJed by the
Irish government has been exploited in no uncenain fashion to ~xpand the pror-;ts of rr.sh firms
over the laSt decade. In this context. the recent decision of the Irish £!OVernme:H lO ex:e;:J he .en
per cent tax rate on manufacturing profits for 3. funher ten years umil the ye:lr 2010 is compiete!y
without justification. Only in cen:J.in circumstances .....ill private business Cx;:::'.n:ioll kJd to
significant employment growth. and these circumstances simply do not exist in I:-eLlnLl:lt pre~cnt.

TABLE 7
Expenditure on Indusrrial Development. 1986

Indusrrial Development Authority
AnCO (FAS)
Coras Trachtab
SFADCo
·Cdaras na Gaeltachta
IIRS/NBST (EOLAS)
Foir Teoranta
Indusrrial Credit Corporation
Dept. of Indusrry Expon Credits
NADCORP
Irish Productivity Council
Irish Goods Council
National Microelectronics Cenrre
Kilkenny Design Workshop
Dept. of Indusrry Adminisrration
Dept. of Finance Adminisrration
Dept. of Labour Adminisrration
Dept. of Gaeltacht Adminisrration

:90.9
56.8
26.9
22.6
19.2
18.6

Total:

371.9

15.2

-u·

3..+
2.9
2.0
1.7
lA
1.2
2.8
0.5
0.1
0.1

(Individual items do not add up to tOtal due to rounding)
Source: Review of Industrial Performance 1986

TABLE 8
Cost of Tax Reliefs for Indusrry (1987/88)
£\1
729.2
131..1
116.0
103.0
9.1.8
9.0
5.6

Expon Sales Relief
10'10 Tax Rate
Shannon Relief
Accelerated Depreciation
Section 84 Loans
Small Companies Rate
Business Expansion Scheme

1,186.2

Total
Source: P3Iliamentary Question 2/11/1989

It is time, therefore, to abandon the highly expensive :.md inc:fficie:1t "~lunderbu?s . ~lppro;lch ~o
indusrrial development which has been pursued for the laSt thiny ye3IS. \Vhat IS needed in~tc~~J
is a much more sharply focussed approach based on :.l cle3I analysis or ~he der'ic:cnc:es in the
Irish indusnial srructure which are inhibiting employment creation. Once these der"icienc:cs h:.l\·c
been identified, specific and highly rargetted action programmes must be devised .tnd
implemented for their elimination.
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THE

\VEA~'1ESSES OF

EXISTI;\G INDCSTRL-\L POLICY: .-\.\" 0 \'ERVIEW

.-\ Basic \lodel of Industrial Development

Given the small size of the domestic Irish economv, an dfecrive ir.dusl....:.al Dolicv C:loaOJe 0r"
providing ample employment opportunities must be based first and t"orer::ost on [he de\·<;;·!opment
of expon markets. The revenues obt:lined from these markets must in :ur:i ~c retained and spent
as far as possible wichin Ireland in order to gain the maximum muitipiier dfects. \lultiplier
effectS can be achieved in three principal ways:
0) Bv eXDortin!2: finns obtainin!2: necessarY raw m:lteri3.1s.
equipment from-su.b-sllpply induscries based in Ireland.

interrnedi~,e

goods. components .lnd

(2) By exporting finns sourcing necessary producer services within Irel:lnd. Producer 5ef\ ices
are those which cater for the requirements of manufacturing induscy'. 3.!1d include scientific
research, product development, marketing, banking and finance. rranspor:. communic3.tions and
information technology, management, and a whole range of business serv'ices including
accountants, lawyers, architects, engineers. e,c.
(3) Throu!2:h the creation of ~eneral consumer services (ret.ailin~, caterin~. suom and leisure. etc.)
via the cu-culation within IIeland of the revenues generated-by the e~'(;:orting and sub-supply
industries and the producer services dependent on these.
\Vhile manufacturin~ indusrrv remains the main basic source of we:llt:: creation in advanced
economies, factory floor jobs 'are no longer conaibuting significantly to er.:;Jloyment growth. due
mainly to the effectS of technological change, especially automation. \los't new jobs 3Ie now
being created in the services, but these in turn depend on the wealth cre:lted in the manufacturing
sector for their existence. It is therefore necessarv to ensure that this ·;,,·ea.th is soent ';,;here it :s
created in order to guarantee that the maximum ~umber of local jobs a:-e generated. It is also
necessary that the wealth-generating capability of manufacturing is maxi::1ised by ensuring [hat
as many stages as possible of the production process are located within Ire!3.nd.
Inadequacies of the Foreign Investment \--lodel

Foreign investment in Ireland is exrremely deficient in this regard, as it imports most at tS
materi?-ls, equipment and service requirements and exports most of the \'ery substantial profits
which it generates (American fIrms in Ireland are chree times more prof~t2.ble than the :lverage
for all American fIrms in the EC). In the past, the IDA made the mist3.ke of depending on
foreign fIrms as a source of direct employment growth, a policy which bec:lme severely unstuck
in the 1980s as output in these firms soared while employment stagnated.
In more recent years, the IDA has anempted [0 overcome these derlc'enc:es by Tying to increase
the contribution of foreim firms to the Irish economv throu~h, for examo!e. the \"Jtional Linkase
Programme. These attemptS have met with only moderate s~uccess. P2J:'~' oec:luse of the inabiiiry
of Irish fmns to meet the supply requirements of the foreign sector. Cltir.:3.tely. ho\\e\er. StriCt
limits are placed on the potential for developing backward linkages in Irel:J.nd by the str:ltegic
imperatives whereby multinational firms seek to disaibute the dirTe:enr elements of their
production and support systems in various countries. In particular. foreign :~rms \vill never locate
top-level technological and management functions in Ireland - the kinds or' functions which are
essential if Ireland is ever to develop any degree of economic indepencence. In addition. [he
rransfer-pricing requirements of foreign finns provide a basic reason for maint3.Jning essenti:ll
input and output linkages in other counaies.

The IDA has also been rrvin~ to move awav from its traditional -::-::ohJsis on :ndustr:ai
investment by encouraging the location of export-oriented service acriv:::-:s' in Irebnd. -r:1US.:l
number of American data processing operations have been located in \L::1ster Jnd Conn:lC:,t ::1
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recent years. The development of the International Financial Services CC:l(re in Dublin :s J
funher major step in this direction. However. this policy simply replic:Hes m:.tny of (he dcfec.:~s of
the failed indusrrial policies of the past. These oper:uions have few links with. :.lnd :herer'ore
commianent to. the rest of the economv. and involve mainlv routine acti\':ties. Thev J.fe m:l:nlv
located here because of cheaper labour'and t3..X incentives.
because or' ..iny Inherent struc:ur~i
advantages offered by Ireland. They do not involve the types of concrol or design functions f':-om
which Ireland can derive signific:lI1t managerial or technological spin-o[·fs. Fi nail y. bein g
foreign-owned. their profits are repatriated for the most pan, rather than being reinveste" :n
Irel:lI1d.

not

Ultimatelv, the most effective wav of stimuliting a services sector in Irebnd which emboeies
sophisticited managerial :lI1d technological functions of a kind \vhich J.fe largely missing :.it
present. and which can act as the ',l,'ell-spring for future development :J.nd growth. is w de\'e:op
organic linkasres with a home-based industrial sector with a strong exoort orientation. This is t!:'c
path which has been followed by all other small counrries which have reached :J.n advanced !e\'ci
of economic development :lI1d employment creation. Tnis is also a path which will ne\'er
materialise in an economy largely dependent on foreign investment.
Inadequacies of the Irish Private Sector

\t1eanwhile, attempts to develop exponing industries from within the native Irish industrial sec:or
have, for the most pan, been an abject failure. This is because the measures used w stimulate
Irish private enterprise do not address itS fundame:1tal weaknesses, These measures have stressed
the reduction of COStS such as wages and taxes. The emohasis olaced bv the srovernment on
investment on infras~cture (espedally roads) in relation w' the EC Structural Fun-ds represe~ts 3.
continuation of this erroneous thinking. While the aim of this investme:1t is w reduce the COStS to
Irish fllTI1s of supplying the EC market, it is more likely to have the effect of making it cheaper
for EC fllTI1s to sell their ~!Oods in Ireland. thereby further undermining native Irish fllTI1s. This is
because there is little prospect of Irish fInns expanding into EC markets on a signific3.nt scale
under present circumstances.
The fundamental weaknesses of Irish private indusrry are small scale and poor org:J.nisacion.
While there are exceptions ro the rule, for the most part successful penetration of international
markets on a sustained basis requires a large scale of operations and strong organisation. Only
firms of this type can afford the high expenditures on technological rese:lfch and development.
and on marketing, which are needed in order to survive and grow in the highly competitive
environment of world markets. Spending by Irish fmns in these are:lS is pitifully low by
international standards. Finland spends three times as much as Irel3.nd on research and
development per head of population, Sweden seven times as much.
Y10st Irish indusrrial fmns are simply tOO small LO develop export markets. no matter how ov.:
their COStS are. This has been made painfully obvious by the lack of expansion of Irish industry
in the 1980s, despite the highly favourable cost environment which has prevailed. The small size
of Irish indusrrial fmns is in turn largelv a retlection of the restriCted size of the domestic [rish
market, which provides a poor base ~pon which to expand abroad. The l:J.ck of this home base
places substantial obstacles in the way of any attempts ro expand the indigenous exporting sector.
:'-ievertheless, the Telesis Report was confident that a suitably energetic and targetted appro:.tch LO
this problem, built around the development of 3. select number of strUctur:.dly strong firms. could
yield the necessary results. This requires 3. shift away from the passive and pemussive :.tpproach
ro indusaial promotion which has obtained up ro now ro a much more focussed :J.nd
interventionist approach on (he pm of the state.
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FOU;\fDATIONS FOR .-\

~EW I~DLSTRIAL

POLICY

In sum. therefore. 3J1 effective economic development policy -::lp;.lbk 1)( .t<.:hic\',ng :':..::1
employment in Irel3J1d in the foreseeable future must include the t'oilo\\ 'r.~ ~cY ingredients:
0) It must be based on manufacturing industry J.S the principal source or' \\c:lltn genC:-:ltiOn

within the economy,
(2)

This manufacturing sector must be vertically integrated i,e. Jll 5rJ.ges of the
process must be located in Ireland.

(3) All essential producer services required by mJ.nurac.:mnng shot.::Li
Ireland.

~e

rr.J.nur·J<.:n.:ri~g

sour...:d :rom \\ lc:1ln

(.+) Preferably, all manufacturing finns should be Irisn-o\l,'ned, 50 that :.;,11 profits generJted :.lCC'Je

to the Irish economy.
(5) Where this is not possible, concrol of manufacturing finns should be based in Ireland, so th:lt

investment decisions will be Irish-oriented.
The ;\'eed for Export Markets
A second set of requiremems derives from the need to base indusrrialis3.tion on the development
of expon markets, given the resrricted nature of the domestic Irish marker. As the Telesis Re?on:
pointed Out, it is not possible to penetrate expon markets by relying on cheap labour (as m3.ny
Third World counrries have tried to do) since Irish labour is far from beinl! Che3.D bv I!lobal
standards. In any case, any attempt to promote Irel3J1d as a source of cheap labour ~ould be
incompatible with the objective of r:using Ireland's relative stJ.nd::...rd of living within :i:e
European Community.
The twin objectives of penerrating export markets and raising standards of living at ;,ome require
industries which can generate a high value of ourput per worker. This can be done either by
achieving a high level of physical productivity (i.e. high quantities of production per worker) for
mass-produced and relatively inexpensive goods, or through securing niche markets for highdemand products with a high value per unit of ourpur. The fonner requires the use of mode:-n
production technologies; the latter can involve either craft-type indusrries for luxury markets or
specialised markers for high-quality products. In all cases. production must be ge:.tred tow2.rds
markets demonstrating long-term growth rrends.
A successful industrial development policy does not require that all i'inns should be exponoriented, What is required is the development of a set of key finns in selected growth 5~crors
capable of competing in international markets. The revenues which thes~ rirms bring home from
abroad will, in turn, suppon additional manufaCturing and service firms ge:tred :0 the home
marker. Experience elsewhere suggests that many of these firms \\. ill c\'~:1tU:l y i.10ve into
expon markets themselves.
Potential Export Growth
"Picking winners" as regards potential future expon markets is an exe:-cise fr:.lu~ht \"ith dJns:er.
and it would be unwise to place all the nation's e\!I!S in too n:.trroW:l ;':In!!e of-bJskcts. ,.i.t-tr-.e
same time. a much more selective approach to Industn:l1 development is required than [h:lt which
has operated in the past. While much deta.iled research will be required in this Jre:l. :.l numbe:- or'
possible product areas suggest themselves as offering particular potentd in the [fish -:ontexr.
These include:
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(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)

(7)
(8)

Elecrronicsrrdecomrnunic:ltions/Inr"onnation Tcchr-ology
Aerospace
ChemicJlslPh:umaceuticals
Biotechnology
Processed FoodIDrink
Plastics
Timber Products
Fashion Clothing

These repres~nt sectors where Ireland either possesses key nat'Jr:ll ;e~ources or h:.ls Jire:.ldv
developed a substantial reputation or expertise. As a consequence. frc!Jnd cnjo: s b:.lsic initi~j
advantages upon which a successful industrial srr:1tegy c::m be built.

A. NE'W STRA.TEGY FOR INDCSTRl-\L DEVELOP\lE:\T

It is acknowledged that foreign investment has made an impoIL3.nt conaibution to economic
growth in Ireland over the past thirty years. :\lany thousands of Irish \":orkers ha \'e found secure
and (by Irish standards) well-paid employment in foreign-owned pl3.nt5 which have brought
modem technology and skills to this counrry. There will always be room for funher high-quality
investments from overseas, particularly from projects in expanc.ing sectors, and/or with the
capability of ma..1<ing a substantia local conrribution over and abo\'e the immediate jobs directly
involved.
It is also acknowledged that policy ma..leers ift both the Industrial Development .Au"honty and 'he
Deparnnents of Indusrry and Finance have become increasingly aware of the de:'ects in past
policies, and have been attempting to be mOie selective, both in terms of incor:1ing investments
and supports for native indusrries. However, the measures ~en so f2I have been piecemeal and
restricted in scope, have not been pursued with sufficient vigour. and have not been underpinned
by an adequate support structure.
If Ireland is to put in place an indusrrial base capable of creating a suffic:ency or" employment

opportUnities for both the present and future generations. a radical new dep<m'Jre is required in
national industrial policy. This will necessitate a massive diversion of the nation's resources financial, human, organisational and institutional - away from their current uses and into a
concenrrated and single-minded effon to create home-based incusrn2.l StruCtu;-cS c::J.pable of
establishing secure and stable foreign markets for Irish goods, and passing the ber.er"its of these
markets on to the Irish population at large in the form of jobs and comr·on::J.ble st::lnd~ds of living
for all. Such a bold and imaginative new depanure will require Jobie ::lnd 'oungeous political
leadership with a breadth and length of vision which has hitherto been nOl:lbly ::lDsent from the
Irish scene.
Keystones of a New Industrial Policy

The key building blocks of the necessary industrial policy include the following:
(1)

Identification of indusrrial sectors and subsectors with !ong-,e;"7';l g,o\\(h ;Jro:>pec S ;md In
which Ireland is capable of developing a comparative J.dvJntJ.ge in intern;word m:.lfke[s.

(2) Identification or establishment of a core group of firms with the ;Jotenti:l1 to cX;J!.oit fully the
prospects identified in (I) above.
(3) Identification or establishment of finns or institutions c::J.pable of supplying eS.:ienti:.ll inputs of
productS and services from within Ireland to the core group of exporting rirms.
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(4) Rationalisation and co-ordination of the state's business suppon
focus on the target sectors/companies.

:lg~:1ci~s

with :.l high-priority

(5) Creation of a supervisory/co-ordinating planning body ~mbr:lcing :h~ :,oci:.ll partners to
establish objectives and t:.u-gets. to oversee the pursuit or' these obj~c:l\ ~s ~lnd [:.lrgc~s . ...lnu co
secure broad cross-communiry co-operation and suppon for their J.c~i~\'eme:1t.
(6) Restructuring of the semi-state sector. the public service and :~e poiitic:J.1 institutions or' the
state in order to create a new dynamism in suppon of the massive n:uion:ll dfon re4ulred by
the proposed industrial policy.
The Role of the State
Because of the fundamental struCtural and organisational weaknesses or' Irish pn\':.lte enrerpris~.
the state must take upon itself the leading role in both formulating .1r..d implementing the new
industrial policy. This has been the essential experience of other late-developing economies
which have successfully made the breakthrough to establishing a strong industrial export b:lse.
The state's role in this task relates to six main areas:
(1) Playing the leading role - in conjunction with the social parcners - in the formulation and

implementation of appropriate corporate and sectoral development pbns.
(2) Providing a strong and effective array of rationalised and co-orCin2,:ed suppon sef\'ices for
the furns and sectors targ:etted in the development plans.
(3) Ensuring that the relevant government departments are 1cequ1tely oriented to the
achievement of these plal1s.
(4) Directing the existing state commercial enterprises to playing a full roie in achieving the plan
objectives.
(5) Utilising the superior financial. technological and organisation8J. resources of the more
successful state enterprises as a base for furore industrial growth.
(6) Utilising strategic state shareholdings in existing and new firms as a quid pro 4UO for the
state's fmancial and fiscal suppon: as a lever to secure compliance with plan t:u-gets: :lnd JS J.
mean~ of promoting an orientation towards Ireland in corporate investment decisions (given
the growing tendency among private Irish finns to direct investment funds abroad rather than
to expansion within Ireland).
STRATEGY FOR\1ULATION: THE
COUNCn...

~ATIONAL

I:\DCSTRIAL DEYELOP\IE:\T

To be successful, the industrial policy requires a concened and combined :lp ro:.lcn on the p:.u-t of
.both t e government ana tl"ieSOCiar an
- - :l l:"J.de unl
;:, lir:rt ~
that a mec anlsm be created wherebv a!rreement can be reached between all concerne on the
broad strategy to be pursued and the m-eans to be employed in pursuit of this strategy, It is
equally vital, once agreement has been reached, that all parties ,0 the :lgreernent t:J.ke
responsibility for securing full co-operation with, and commitment to. the objectives or" the
strategy within their respective constituencies.
The Workers' Pany therefore proposes the establishment of a ~.-\ TIONAL I:\DLSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT COC~CIL (~IDC) to oversee the fonnulation :lnd impk:nenration of ..1
NATIONAL Il'JDUSTRL.i..L DEVELOP:VIE;\iT PLAN (l\IDP). 3. rolling pbn incorpor:lting
both medium (five-ye:.u-) and long (20-25 ye::u-) tenn objectives. the fonner updated on :.In ,lnnu~l
basis and the latter on a five-ye:.u- basis. The ~C would draw its membership from the
1..+

OireachtaS and the recognised social parmers according to a formula LO be Jgreed. Jnd v.'ould
have the final say in detennining the srructure and content of the :-:IDP. especiJily in determining
priorities and the measures required to pursue these priorities. In ;-e:urn for rhis power. :he
constituent elements in the ~1DC would be expected to secure compliJnce \\irh he \'IDP ~'rom
within their respective constituencies. It is vital that broad popular support be obtJwed ['or :he
NTDP. and the ~IDC would have the key role to play in this respect. The \'IDC would J!:,o n:.l\'e
an overall supervisory role in monitOring the progress and evolution of :he \,IDP,
In its deliberations. the ~IDC would be advised both by its own SeGetm:H. which must be
adequately funded in order to ensure the recruitment of personnel of the highest calibre. and by :.l
Consultative Committee made up of technical 'experts from Third Level coile~es. rese:l!'ch
institutes and the research departments of social partner organisations.
Preliminary formulation of :-'1DC policy would be undertJ..ken via a system or' sub--.:ommit:ees.
divided intO two broad groups. The SectOral Group would focus on those sectOrs of the economy
targetted for panicular attention by the ~1DC. For each sector. medium and long Lerm
production targets would be set. appropriate corporate srructures for achieving these targets
would be identified, and means and mechanisms for putting these structures intO place would be
. devised.
The InfrastrUcture Group would focus on broad infrastrUctural areas of the economy (transport,
communications, energy, education/training) with a view to securing rational and co-ordinated
planning within each of these areas, and compliance between them and the needs of the :-'IDP.
. At the moment, where it exists at all, there is a great degree of incohe:ence and contradiction in
government policy in all of these areas, and this must be sorted out if the :-:IDP is to be
successfully implemented. For exalnple, there is an urgent need for an integrated policy for
road/rail/pon: networks for containerised tranSpOrt.
Apm from the broadly identified social panners. the :-'1DC sub-committees woulc Cr2.W
additional membership from groups and organisations of particular relevance to the respective
sectors (e.g. ICOS, Teagasc and environmental groups in the Food Indusrr:' Sub-Committee and
Aer Lingus, CrE and the Road Hauliers Association in the Transpon: Sub-Committee).

THE SUPPORT SYSTEM
Tnere is already in existence a multiplicity of state agencies whose function is to support
business development and general economic development. However. there is no erTective 0\'e:a1l
strUcture for supervising, co-ordinating and monitoring these agencies. This in part refleCtS the
lack of an overall plan to which the agencies can relate. As a result. there is much duplkation
and conflict among the present array of suppOrt agencies.

:'l.-\ TIO~.-\L I~DlSTRL-\L
to provide the various support
functions required for the implementation of me ,IIDP, All existing support Jgcncies would be
subsumed into the ~IDB as separate divisions. These would include:

The

Workers'

Party

proposes

the

esrablishment

of

a

DEVELOP\1ENT BOARD (:'lIDB) whose function would be

(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(S)

Research and Technology (EOLAS, Teagasc. IPC)
Educationrrraining (FAS. IMl)
Industrial Promotion (IDA. SFADCO, L'daras na Gaelta<.:hta. :\'ADCORP)
Finance (ICe. ACC)
YIarketing (CBF, ACC)

in

Some rationalisation and resrrucruring of existing agencies would be required
orce:- :0
fit into this divisional strUcture. In providing services to client firms. the :-:ros would oper:lte
commercially by either (a) charging directly for these services or (b) secunng sh:ueholdings
and/or seats on the board of directors in these finns. Past exoerience SU!!f!ests thJl "free" :.ld... ice
is open to abuse, and may not always represent an effective us'e of scarce p'l:rblic resources.
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PLAN

L\1PLE~1E:\TATIO:"J

A key element in the proposed support structure is an EXECCTIVE TASK FORCE (ETF)
system, whereby a separate ETF, working to srrategic plans formubted by the ~rDc. lnLl
comprised of professionals drawn from the relevant divisions of the ~mB, \vould work ,;!osc::with fInns in each economic sectOr targerted by the ~IDP in order to ensure compliance with ::-.e
plan for that sector. This "..; ould involve drawing up a detailed roiling corporate devdopr.:c::t
plan for each client finn in the context of the overall sector plan. ETFs would also \york '.\.::h
groups of firms to promOte mergers, liaisons, joint ventures. supply agreements :lnd jo::1t
marketing arrangements. where these are envisaged by the sectOr plan.
The aim of this approach is to replace the advisory and 3.nalysis cmpi1:J.ses or' the existing st~te
agencies with a more positive 3..nd pro-active executive emphasis. It would give higher priority :0
developing existing flnns 3.S against promoting new stan-ups. '.vith \\hich the inJusr:-:..:.i
promotion agencies tend to be preoccupied (panly in response to political pressures) at present. It
would create an integrated network which would provide more efficient linkages between :he
various components of the support system than is cunently the C:lse. At the moment, there is :l
considerable amount of overlap and rivalry between many of the state' s promotional agencies (:J.S
between the IDA, SEWCo and Cdaras na Gaeltachra): the proposed new structure would
rationalise these into a leaner and more co-ordinated system in which each component wOllid
have a specifIc role to play in pursuing the shared overall objeCiive of national econorr.ic
development. The proposed "matrix" net\vork (see diagram below) for linking these components
together is corrunon among larger (and therefore more successful) multin2.tional firms.
Operating under a SectOr :\13..nager. each ETF would be primarily orie:1ted towards the c!ie:1t
sector rather than the ~IDB cii visions from which personnel would be seconded. ETF personnel
would be recruited, rrained and paid for by their parent )iIDB divisions, and distributed :J.I:1ong
ETFs according to prearranged criteria. Subject to agreed overall budget allocations. the ETFs
would have a high level of independent executive power as regards the disbursement of loans :lr:d
grants and the implementation of other measures designed to ensure plan compliance among
client fU1IlS. The ETFs would be flexibly staffed, with provision for ready interchangeability
between ETFs.
The ETFs would report to the corresponding Sectoral Sub-Committees of the :--;IDC and thence
to the NIDC itself. ETF managers would be appointed by the ~IDC f:-om among the personr:e!
nominated to the ETFs from the ~IDB divisions. SectOral plans \..; ould be updated and revised
on the basis of ongoing consultations between the ETFs and the SectOral Sub-Committees.
~ifficulties which arise in specific sectOrs in relation to areas such as legislation, regul:Hion.
mdustrial relations. flnance, plan compliance. etc. would be referred to [he ~IDC for arbitration
(and possible referral to the Oireachtas) by ETF managers.
A schematic plan of the proposed structure is presented on the following page.
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THE ROLE OF THE STATE COMMERCIAL SECTOR
Th~ state commercial sector will have a key role to play in the new indusma.1 ~olicy :·or :hree

mam reasons:

(1) State-owned enterprises a.lready comprise a large component of the Insh naconal ~conomy
(over 11 % of GDP and over 6% of total employment). Investment dec:sions :n this sec:or
therefore will have a very significant national impact.

(2) Yiost State-owned enterprises occupy crucial positions in the infnsO"'Jc:ure of :h~ :1:1[:on:11
economy (energy, a-anspon, communications). This confers on them 3. tJan:c:.l1J.r:y .:;::-:~:ll :-o:~ ::1
terms of their contribution to the ~ational Industrial Development Plan.
(3) Many state-owned enterprises represent major national reposirones or" [echnologlCJl ~o 50
information technology; mechamcal, chemical and electrical engineenng: ~'ood ;;roasstng) :1nd
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r:1anagement skills which :rre in SC:lrce supply md will be of c;"~c::.:.l :mpor.:lnc::: :D the
achievement of the :--JIDP. In addition. because their scale: of oper:Hions 1S LlUl(C LJ.rgc by Irish
industrial standards, they offer considenble potential as bases for ;:::::1CIT:lt:r1g 'ntcr;;:ltlOI1JI
markets. It is envisaged. therer"ore. that the enterprises in question (T::::c;:o~1 E::-e:.tnl1. ESB . .-\c
Line:us. Irish SU2:arlErin Foods. etc.) will themselves act as core cor:;-=:.:.;~;cs ;n the DrocC~:i ut'
industrial expansion.
_

_

.

1

The Workers' Party believes that 3. tlexible approach should be adop:ed :-eg:lfding thc role or
state enterprise in pursuing national industrial development. Where s,::,:c .:ompanics :.:.re bcs'
placed to exploit industrial development opportunities. then they ~hou;c :-.0[ bc pre\'cnted r';-ol~
doing so for politicJ.l or ideological reasons. Similarly, where pri'"3.te e:1tcrpn:ic otTers t~e DC~'
potential, and is prep:lred co \'-'ork within the scope of the :\ational Inc:,:s':,,:al Dc \ e!opmcr t PL:n
(:--rIDP) , then it should be given every 3.ssistance to get on 'ovith the joD. Joint \cn:c:res o::::\\CC:1
state enterprises and private firms should also be facilitated and cncocf:J.ged \vhere :.l mutu:.:.i
benefit offers itself. \(-lhere investment opportunities 3.rise from the :\ID P \vhich the private
sector is not prepared to pursue, and which are not appropriate to :l.ny of the existing state
enterprises, then new state enterprises should be established to exploit these opportunities.
Strategic State Shareholdings in the Private Sector
Apan from investments by state-owned enterprises, the state should 3.1so be prepa:"ed to :J.cquire
strategic shareholdings (i.e. sufficiently large to have a strong influence Oil major decisions) 1:1
key private firms in order ro influence their investment decision-miling. \:,ith a view ro secur..ng
compliance with the requirements of the :"iIDP. The fact that the Irish L:e Assunnce Comp:lny
already has significant shareholdings in many major ~sh private cor::panies confers on it
considerable pOtential influence on the development of these companies. Privatisation of Irish
Life would mean the loss of what could become an important lever in ac:Jieving the objectives of
the NIDP.
Strategic state shareholdings would also be of impOrtance in orienting suc~essr"ul firms ro\V3.rCs
locating future investments in Ireland rather rhan overse:ls. However. a ::exible :lpproach is aLso
called for here, as overseas investments mav rhemselves be of siI'ate~ic imDortance in some Cl.ses
to the finns in question.
•
.
The proposed strategic shareholdings would be vested in the Nation:ll Indusrri:ll Developme:1t
Board. These shareholdings, along with those accumulated in private ~()mpanies in return for
direct financial assistance, would be managed by a separate Treasury Di';ision of t!le Board. The
Treasury Division's ponfolio of shareholdings would be subject to ongoing review in the light of
the progress of the Development Plan, with new share holdings bei:lg :lcquired or existing
holdings being divested depending on the performance of individual cam?anies in ,he context or"
the Plan.
Restructuring the State Commercial Sector
If the state commercial sector is ro make its maximum conaibution :0 n:Hion:ll muustr!:ll
development, then some fundament:J.! alterations will be required in ::-:e wJ.y :he sector is
structured and run. These alterations 3.re based on the fundament:J.l ;:;:-:nciple th:.lt commercial
state companies will make their best national conaiburion in the Ion £ ;-un bv beim~ run 3.:.
efficiently as possible. Where they 3.re required to take on non-econorr::c ~oci:J.l ~esponsibilities.
they should be fully compensated for this by government It is absolute:\' essenti:J.l h:H the :itare
commercial sectOr be freed from impositions based on short-[e~ soci:l1 or politic:!
consider:J.tions.

In order to allow the state commercial sectOr to play its proper role in r.:lr:onallicvc!opmC::lL the
following measures must be implemented:
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(1) State-owned enterprises should be freed from J.11 departmental or ;Joiitlc:ll interfe:-encc Jp:.!It
from the need to comply with the broad objectives laid down in the secwral ~md infrastructure
plans formulated by the ~ational Industrial Development Council (:\IDC).
(2) Appointments to the Boards of state enterprises should be removed r":-om [he polic:cJi .trc;~J

through the establishment of a statutory appointments conunission comprised or' represenrati \ eS
of all parliamentary parties. the civil service. social panners. and the educ:lQon/rese:.m.:h se~'or.
(3) A mechanism needs to be created to facilitate conunercial interaction between the "mous
companies in the commercial state sector. At present, for a variety of reasons. including
historical factors. political interference. and 'poor management in some cases. ~tate enterprises
very considerably in efficiency and profitability. A mechanism such :lS :m overJ. 1 holding
company for state enterprises (such as exists in Italy) or an intern~l market :n (he sh:lI"es of these
enterprises would allow joint ventures between state enterprises panial or outright t:lkeo\·ct"s 0:·
one enterprise by another. This would both facilitate the spread of efficiency within ,he: ieC:or
generally, and provide a medium whereby resources could pass from capit.1l-rich [Q capital-poor
enterprises.

(4) All transactions between state enterprises should be transparent.
At present. there is
considerable subsidisation going on within the state sector. Examples include the price paid by
the ESB to Bard na Mona for peat supplies, the price at which Bard Gais Eireann supplies g3.S to
NET, and the free travel schemes operated by ClE. Because this subsidisarion is nO( openly
quantified, it is not possible to assess its validity. Subsidies - which have a social rather than
economic basis - should be paid for from the central exchequer rather th~n thro~gh state
enterprises. This will require the government to put an exact COSt on all subsidies, as an essential
prerequisite for judging their political justifiability.
.

(5) The internal functioning of many state enterprises must be drastically overhauled. Some of
these enterprises have a poor industrial relations record, for a variety of reasons, including large
size which hinders effective communications, outdated mana\?:emenr structures and artitud~s. low
morale due to chronic underfunding by the stare, and the fact that many of the enterprises in
question provide essential services which can be exploited as bargaining pieces. Consider:lble
resources need ro be devoted to professionalising management and training strUcrures in these
enterprises. The concept of promotion on merit must be universalised throughout the p·ublic
service as an essential prerequisite to national efficiency. PromOtions procedures must be open
and accountable in order to gain trade union acceptance of this vital concept. Worker
participation must be extended well beyond the election of worker members ro the boards of st:.te
enterprises, although this initial step should be extended irrIInediately ro all such enterprises.

RESTRUCTURING THE STATE BUREAUCRACY
The present civil service structures have remained essentially unchanged since the nineteenth
century. Whether or not they were ever appropriate, they clearly require radio.! and urgent
restrUcrunng as we enter the last decade of the twentieth cenrury. Among the key reforms \VhlCh
are required are:
(1) Constant monitoring of the cost effectiveness of current procedures :lnd strucrures.
Traditional preoccupations with accounting for every lasr penny, or with preventlng cven tr:e
most trivial forms of cheating, frequently cost far more money than they save. The :lcross-[heboard application of the public service pay embargo meant that in many cJ.ses (e.g. i:lX collcction!
positions which were more than capable of paying for themselves remained unfilled.
(2) Delegation of responsibility throughout the public service ro the lowest :lppropr.:lte le'. cls.

allied to the introduction of group decision-making at all levels. The present ch.1ins of comm:lnd
and lack of local accountability within the public service are both morale-sapping Jnd extremely
wasteful of human resources.
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(3) Introduction of promotion on merit throughout the public service. ;or the S:lme :-e::lsons .lno
under the same procedures 3.S for the state commercial sector (see Jbove l.
These measures are required. nOt only in order to promote gre::lter natIon:ll ci'r"ic:e:1cy ge:-:e:-:l1'y,
but to ensure that those elements of the public service which are invoh'ed. direciy :1Od inliire~:ly,
in the process of national industrial development are imbued with the kinds or' cr"ficie:1cy ..lriLi
dynamism which will be essential in order to ensure the success of this process,

THE

~EED

FOR POLITICAL

REFOR~1

There is widespread recognition that the way the Irish politiol process has evoh'ed :~ :1\)1
conducive to effective economic planning and development, due to the permeation of this process
with petty parochialism (which makes it difficult to see the national woods from the local trees!.
shon-term perspectives (which make long-term planning difficult), and routine political
interference in pursuit of narrow interests throughout the public service (including the
commercial state sector),
.
Very radical changes are needed if the political sys~em is to be capable of fully supponing the
national development effon. These include political reforms which will orientate the Oireachtas
to policies rather than personalities. and to national rather than local issues. The elimination of
petty political interference in the operations of the s'tate' s industrial promotion agencies is a
priority requirement in this respect.
A major decentralisation of services and powers - accompanied by appropriate funding - 0
regional and local authorities is also urgently required. Regional authorities would liaise with the
~ational Industrial Development Council regarding the regional dimensions of 'i1e ~atior;3.1
Industrial Development Plan through a :"-lational Council of Regional Authorities.
Apan from contributing to the democratisation of Irish society, decentralisation offers the
potential for unlocking energies which can serve the national interest but \vhich currently remain
untapped due to the stultifying effects of our centralised machinery of state. It also facilit:nes
more accurate identification of local needs and resources than a centralised approach is capable
of. Finally, decentralisation would allow central government to refocus its attention on broad
national issues, including in particular the over-riding issue of mobilising the nation' s resources
to tackling 0ur chronic past failures in the areas of economic growth and employment creation.

THE NEED FOR L'iDUSTRIAL DE'10CRACY
The planning structures outlined in this document carry with them the dangers of In amldemocratic corporatism; built-in checks are necessary in order to counter such tend~ncies. Tn~
provisions for more local and regional democracy provide one such set of checks. In addition.
there is a need for a thorough-going democratisation of the workplace. nOt JUSt in the public
service and the state commercial sector, but throughout the private business sector JJso.
Industrial democracy requires real. effective and ongoing panicipation by workers in bOth rhe
management AND ownership of the fIrms in which they work (whether privately or publiciy
owned). This involves participation in decision-making at the office/shop tloor level :lS well JS :lt
the level of the Board of Directors. Apan from being a desirable objective in r~:ms of the
thorough democratisation of Irish society. such panicip:uion is essentlal to the objectives 'H·
enhancing economic efficiency and securing the co-operarion of \vorkers in pursuing .he t:lTg~ts
of the National Industrial Plan.
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A culture of industrial democracy is an essential prerequisite to the humo.niso.tion of t~chnology.
private industry, technology and labour are seen as interchangeable me:l!1S to the single Jim of
realising profit. Technology is not seen. therefore. as a meo.IlS of ~:uic~ing hum:ln ~xis,enc~.
including human labour. Instead. it is frequently seen by workers as :l competitive rhreJt to thelr
livelihoods. Industrial democracy provides the potential for a siw:Hion \\lhere '.~orkers ~Ce
themselves as working WITH. ramer than AGAL\iST. technology. in their o\\;n interests. This;n
tum lays me basis for developing new forms of, or new uses for. technology wherein \\lork (:.ill
become a more meaningful and creative experience for those carrying :t out.

rn
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THE :\'EED FOR A El:ROPEA~ L'JDCSTRIAL POLICY
The Treatv of Rome, which in effect is the constitution of the Euroo~:m Com:nunit\' (EO.
contains cm explicit commitment to balanced regional development within the Community. ..\r
the moment, the bulk of the EC's resources are devOted to the Common Amcultural Policy
(CAP), mainly in me form of subsidies to agriculrural producers. The main beneticiaries of these
subsidies have been the most efficient producers, who are mainly found in the more advanc~d
ree:ions of the Communitv.
~

J

While agriculture forms an important pan of the economies of the EC's peripheral regions, and
c.i\P subsidies have had a positive impact on incomes in these regions, the emphasis on subsidies
Lr1 any case, on-far.n
does little to improve structures and efficiency in these regions.
employment offers little prospect of long-term expansion. If the EC is to be serious about the
development of its peripheral regions, then the emphasis must be placed on industrial
development in these regions. Funher, for reasons explained earlier in this document, effective
industrial development must be based on integrated indigenous industry. rather than the type of
branch-plaflt industrialisation which up to now has been mainly characteristic of these regions.
The Europeafl Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) have
been me main instruments employed by the EC to promote industrialisation in its peripheral
regions. However, these have been poorly funded relative to me C..-\.P, afld have been mainly
directed towards infrastructure, grants for individual industrial projects (mainly br-mch plantS),
and training. They merefore have not cackled the basic inadequacies in terms of business
structures which Ireland shares with most of the EC's other peripheral regions.

r

There is a need, mere fore, for a COMMON INDUSTRIAL POLICY (CIP) to rationalise :lnd
co-ordinate industrial policy within the EC. Various separate measures are currently in oper:ltion
within the Community to strengthen industry vis-a-vis external competitors (especially the CSA
and Japafl); however, these need the overall co-ordinating structure which a CIF would provide.
The funher enhancement of the Single Market after 1992 will also accelerate the process or"
rationalisation, which at the moment is hindered bv the continued orientation of most EC industrv'
to its own national c o n t e x t . '
.
The CIP would have a particularly important role to play in terms of the EC's peripheral regions.
At present, these regions almost uniformly emphasise the atrraction of mobile investment as the
main plank of industrial development policy. This leads to competitive bidding be[\veen these
regions, me main beneficiaries of which are the mobile rinns themselves. rather than the regions.
There is a need for co-ordinated action to counter this approach by firSt of all imposing a
standardised framework of industrial incentives in all regions qualifying r'or regional assistance.
More importafltly, the emphasis in indusnial policy must be shifted from atrracring extem:l!
investment and improving infrastructure towards direct measures aimed at srren2[hemne:
indigenous industry within the regions along the lines recommended for Ireland in this docum~nt.
Wimout such measures. the peripheral status of these regions will only be runher enh:.lnced in [he
aftermath of 1992. The Workers' Partv, therefore. will c.1moai2n throu!:!h the Eurooe~:1
Parliament for the introduction of a Common Industrial Policy; for the -u-ansfer theretO of muc~ or
the existing EC resources which :It the moment are directed elsewhere: and for the EC to raise J.
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volume of extra revenue from the wealthier memb~r ~t.1(cS in urder '0 m:lke J onc~
assault on the indusoial deticiencies of the Community's poorer :-eglOns. T::~
to radic3..l action in the short tenn is cominw:d subsidiSJtion or" J '.\,'~:lk ;Je~phc;y ,)n J
basis.

FOR THE INDCSTRIAL POLICY

As detailed earlier in this document. very considerable public resources are curre;:(' y JevOted ,0
economic development in Irelmd. with negligible results. The Workers' Plrty be!ie\'cs ::-.:It
much more effective use c:m be made of this existin!! fundin!!, (hroue:h better t::lnl:errin!! Jnd ;:-:or~
efficient utilisation of the state support agencies. as has been outline-d. In addition. ,h~ proposc~
shift in emphasis from grant funding to loans and shareholdings. and from free ;Jro\ ;~iiJL" o{
services to a system of charges. would prove much less onerous on the state's cor"fers.
The proposed EC Common Indusoial Policy, if implemented. '"vould also provide substanti.1l
additional funding in support of the national indusoial development effort. Further funding can
also, if required. be made available through various TAX REFOR.\·1 measures. These inciuce
more efficient collection from the self-employed and the private business sector; widening the tax
base via taxes on property, wealth and capital; and higher effective rates of company tax on
manufacturing firms, which at the moment are unnecessarily low at·virtually zero.
It is reasonable to expecrfll111s which have benefitted from the state's indusoial planning policies
to make a reciprocal rerum to the state in the fonn of tax revenues; the emphasis on developing
indigenous indusoies rather than attracting foreign finns will make it more pr::.cticable to levy
taxes on manufacturing firms. Foreign firms which elect to move out following the introduction
of effective taxation are a flimsy base upon which to build an economy in any C:lse. lnd should
not be allowed to prevent courageous action in this area.

CONCLUSION

!'

Tnere is an urgent need for a major restructuring of Irish industrial policy. Portr:l.yed by most J.S
an opportunity, 1992 in fact looms like a spectre over the Irish economy. The failure of past
industrial policies has left Ireland with a weak business structure which is cert:lin to be further
undermined by the increased exposure to external competition which will result from the
completion of the Single European Ytarket. Unless Ireland manages to build up its o\vn set of
strong firms capable of meeting the European challenge. Irish-owned finns will inevitably be
gobbled up by stronger competitors abroad as the process of cont:nenral rationalisation proceeds
apace.
Unless something radical is done immediately, Ireland faces the prospect of perpetual
underdevelopment. with those citizens who are left at home facing 3. future of second-c!:>.ss
employment in branch plants of uncertain stability, or in hotels and guesthouses c3.(enng for (he
luxury needs of our better-off European "partners".
The policy of providing incentives and sitting back, hoping th:H the private secwr. on irs ov,,'n
initiative. will leap to the nation's rescue, has been completely discredited. Vast :lmounrs of
scarce public resources have been squandered in the process. Only vigorous 3.nd direct st:lte
intervention. operating through a coherent and co-ordin:lted planning proc~ss. offers 3.ny
possibility of avoiding the ble:l.k future outlined above.

In this document. the Workers' Pany has provided a blueprint for how such J p!:lnning proc~ss
can be structured and implemented. This blueprint is design~d La rep!:lce Irel2.mi" s presc;lt
anaemic business culture with a new culture of efficiencv, :lchievement :lnd success. '..... ith:n
which human enennes md cre:ltivitv can be released and fuflv realised. and within \\/hic~ hurr.:ln
values. democracy -and participation' can co-exist with prosperity 3.nd secure employment for :lIt.

